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Sidestep the WTO through its Ban on
GMOs: A Response to Sarah Lively's
Paper, "The ABCs and NTBs of GMOs"
Johannes S.A. Claus lHI*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, the European Union has passed a number of
Regulations and Council Directives that have restricted the "release into the
environment" and "placing on the market" of Genetically-Modified Organ-
isms, or GMOs.I The European Union has also mandated that any product
containing GMOs or derivatives of GMOs be labeled as such.2 These poli-
cies have greatly restricted the importation of agricultural and foodstuff
products into the European Community ("EC") from the United States.
In an article recently published in this Journal, Ms. Lively details her
belief that these E.U. policies, which have been challenged by the United
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A. Boise State Uni-
versity, 2001.
1 Council Directive 2001/18/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1.
2 Council Regulation 258/97, 1997 O.J. (L 43) 1; Council Regulation 1139/98, 1998 O.J.
(L 159) 4.
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States, would withstand scrutiny by a World Trade Organization dispute
settlement body. Specifically, Ms. Lively maintains that the Regulations
and Directives passed by the European Union are in harmony with the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
4
("SPS") and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 5 ("TBT"), ancil-
lary agreements to the Marrakesh Agreement, which created the World
Trade Organization ("WTO").
The purpose of this paper is to refute Ms. Lively's article, detailing the
reasons why the E.U. legislation is not in harmony with the WTO agree-
ments. This paper will argue that if a WTO dispute settlement body were to
decide upon the validity of the current European GMO regime, it would
strike down the regulation as contrary to the WTO agreements signed by
the European Union and the United States. The European Union's four
year moratorium on GMOs continues to be one of the most hotly-contested
trade issues facing it and the United States. Officially, U.S. patience with
the E.U. refusal to process applications for biotechnology imports is "grow-
ing very thin.",6 Currently, the U.S. Trade Representative is considering fil-
ing a case against the European Union in the WTO.7  Given the
diametrically opposed positions of the United States and the European Un-
ion on this issue, the debate over GMO regulation will most likely be re-
solved before an international dispute settlement body, not through bilateral
agreement of the parties. The premise of this article is that if the WTO re-
solves this dispute, it will decide in favor of the United States 8
3 Sarah Lively, Comment, The ABCs of NTBs and GMOs: The Great EU v. US Trade
Debate-Do European Restrictions on the Trade of Genetically Modified Organisms Violate
International Trade Law?, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 239 (2002).
4 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867
U.N.T.S. 495, 496 [hereinafter SPS Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs e/legale/1 5-sps.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2003).
5 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT
Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docselegal_e/17-tbt.pdf (last visited
Nov. 10, 2003).
6 Kathryn McConnell, Veneman Says U.S. Patience with EU Growing Thin, U.S. De-




7 Ann Veneman, U.S. Considering Action Against EU on Biotech Imports, U.S. Depart-
ment of State, Feb, 20 2003, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/biotech/
03022101.htm (last visited July 21, 2003).
8 Since I began writing this article in September of 2002, the debate over genetically-
modified organisms has intensified to the point that the United States government, with the
support of Australia and Canada, announced in June 2003 that it will file suit with the WTO
against the European Union's moratorium on importing or planting GMOs in the European
Union. Since billions of dollars and farmers' livelihoods are at stake on either side of the At-
lantic, not to mention the implications of GMO use on the environment and on the very lives
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Part II of this paper will briefly review the nature of the debate be-
tween the United States and the European Union regarding the use and
regulation of GMOs. Part III will explain why this issue is one that could
affect the lives of millions around the world, particularly in developing na-
tions. Part IV will detail the provisions of the E.U. legislation that regulate
the import and distribution of GMOs within the EC. Part V will provide a
legal analysis showing how the European regulatory regime on GMOs fails
to comply with the WTO agreements, including influential WTO dispute
settlement decisions that may help determine the direction a WTO dispute
settlement body may take on the GMO issue. Part VI will then attempt to
refute the exaggerated claims of the risk posed by GMOs that Ms. Lively
uses to defend the European Union's regulation of GMOs. Part VII will
conclude that the E.U. regime would fail WTO scrutiny.
II. THE DEBATE SURROUNDING GENETICALLY-MODIFIED ORGANISMS
In the last decade, scientists and agronomists (partly in the United
States and Canada, but significantly in Europe and elsewhere as well) have
unleashed advances in the production of crops9 that have not been seen
since the Green Revolution of the 20th Century.' 0 Through the use of new
gene transfer technology, crops can now be created that are resistant to her-
bicides, resistant to pests, are generally sturdier, more durable, and more
nutritious." These crops have increased yields and reduced costs for farm-
ers, as less pesticide has to be used in the production of these crops.' 2 There
are also environmental benefits, as fewer toxins will be used in the produc-
tion of crops.' 3 Third World nations would most benefit from the increased
yields and nutritional benefits of crops such as "Golden Rice" (fortified
with Vitamin A) and other foodstuffs that have been infused with vitamins
of many Third World citizens, this is a struggle that will not subside in the near future. It is
the author's hope that this article will shed some light on this bitter debate as well as provide
a road map for some of the arguments that will be made before the WTO dispute resolution
bod y.
I will not attempt to explain the science of GMO technology or give a history of its de-
velopment in this article. For an informative discussion on the technology of GMOs, see
Sophia Kolehmainen, Precaution Before Profits: An Overview of Issues in Genetically Engi-
neeredFood and Crops, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 269 (2001).
10 Judy Aita, Developing Countries Should Adopt Biotech, UN Panelists Urge; They say
the technology can improve yields, yield more nutrition. WASH. FILE, U.S. Dept. of State,
Sepf.24, 2002, available at, http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/usandun/02092422.htm.
Jeffrey K. Francer, Frankenstein Foods or Flavor Savers?: Regulating Agricultural
Biotechnology in the United States and European Union, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 257, 263
(2000).
Aita, supra note 10. C.S. Prakash, Director of Plant Molecular Genetics at Tuskegee
University, stated in this article that GMO crops have reduced pesticide use in cotton and
maize by 46 million pounds, and simultaneously offered increased yields and reduced pro-
duction costs.
13 Stanley H. Abrahamson & J. Thomas Carrato, Crop Technology: The Case for Product
Stewardship, 20 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 241, 243 (2001).
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or other nutrients through genetic engineering. 14 Therefore, while the de-
veloped nations of the world "have the freedom to debate the pros and cons
of their development and consumption of GMOs, it would be wrong for
such debate to impede basic research" that could truly benefit the living
standard of the developing world.'5
Europe has, for the most part, been a staunch detractor of these new
technologies from the 1990s to the present.' 6 As a result of the pressure
from interest groups within Europe' and an increasingly skeptical public,
the European Union has enacted a series of measures designed to stop the
import of GMOs as well as the domestic production of these products until
they can be scientifically proven safe.' 8 The European Union has also cre-
ated strict guidelines for the labeling of food products that contain or con-
sist of GMOs, 19 which has made export of crops to the European Union
difficult given that there is no system in the United States for dividing bulk
agricultural goods into GMO and GMO-free shipments.2 °
III. THIS DEBATE HAS FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES FOR THE
DEVELOPING WORLD
The success or failure of GMOs will have tangible and immediate im-
pact on a developing world struggling with famine, crop disease, and
chronic food shortages. For instance, a cotton farmer in India sells his kid-
ney to help pay off his debts, rendering him unable to work, even though
cotton seed is available that is resistant to the pests that destroyed his crop.
Zambia rejects food aid shipments from the United States, although the na-
tion is suffering from a region-wide famine that threatens the lives of 15
14 Ronald Cantrell, Rice Essential for Global Security, Stability, ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES, May 9, 2002, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/regiona/nea/sasia/
text/0509rice.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).
15 Id. Ronald Cantrell is the Director General of the International Rice Research Institute
in the Philippines. His views are shared by the Bush Administration and Agriculture Secre-
tary, Ann Veneman. See Ann Veneman, Remarks by Secretary of Agriculture Ann M Ve-
neman at the 79th Agricultural Outlook Forum, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/
xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2003&m=February&
x=20030221141755odessey@pd.state.govO.704632&t-xarchives/xarchitem.html&
Pl{PSESSID=c7eec3bc9c939c4d5b2bf9dcca7l19bfd (Feb. 20, 2003).
16 Nigel Williams, Agricultural Biotech Faces Backlash in Europe, 281 ScI. 768 (Aug. 7,
1998).
17 Farmers, environmental groups like Greenpeace, and even factions of the Catholic
Church have been involved in pushing for regulations or moratoria on GMOs within Europe.
See generally Francer, supra note 11.
'
6 Council Directive 2001/18/EC, supra note 1.
'9 Council Regulation 258/97, supra note 2; Council Regulation 1139/98, supra note 2.20 Ved Nanda, Genetically Modified Food and International Law-The Biosafety Proto-
col and Regulations in Europe, 28 DENV. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 235, 262 (2000).
21 John Biewen, Engineering Crops in a Needy World, Amer. Radio Works, available at
http://americanradioworks.org/features/gmosindia/story/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).
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million people . The Philippines debates whether or not to allow research
on a type of rice that is resistant to blight, although this rice would boost
yield at a lower cost in this poor and growing nation.23
What do all of these scenarios have in common? They have all re-
sulted, to a certain extent, from countries' fears that the use of genetically-
modified ("GM") crops in their countries would render their exports inad-
missible to the European Union's market.24 Some African scientists have
recently agreed with U.S. charges that the European Union indirectly pres-
sures African officials to reject GM food aid.2  The scientists stated that
E.U.-funded groups such as Oxfam and Save the Children "have frightened
African governments 'v26 into rejecting food aid containing GMOs. These
fears have also kept many developing nations from allowing new GM crop
seeds to enter their countries. This is in spite of the fact that these crops
could boost production, using less pesticide, increasing nutrition, or grow-
ing on less-productive land.27
It is estimated that in the next two to three decades, two billion people
will be added to the ranks of the human race,28 and all of these people will
need to eat. The GM foods that have been designed have tremendous pos-
sibility to increase yield per acre, decrease the use of costly and environ-
mentally damaging pesticide, allow planting in previously fallow soil, and
even increase the nutritional value of the crops. 29 These crops could be a
real asset to a poor or developing country struggling to feed its population
or boost its export revenue. 3  But recent actions by the European Parlia-
ment and other legislative bodies, including the Japanese Parliament, could
effectively strangle these possibilities by increasing the cost of exporting
crops to these nations, hampering gains from international trade. Even
worse, these restrictions by the European Union could decrease incentives
to research new strains of crops, killing any future gains from this promis-
22 David Gollust, Africa Raises Questions on 'Biotech' Food Aid, VOA NEWS, Aug. 21,
2002, available at http://greennature.com/article 1607.html.
23 Environmental News Services, Genetically Modified Rice Tests Alarm Philippine
Farmers, available at http://www.thecampaign.org/newsupdates/aug00i.htm (Aug. 17,
2002).
24 Gollust, supra note 22.
25 Briefly: BRUSSELS, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2003, at A12.
26 I.
27 Kurt Buechle, The Great Global Promise of Genetically Modified Organisms: Over-
coming Fear, Misconceptions, and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 283, 290 (2001).
28 Julie Teel, Rapporteur 's Summary of the Deliberative Forum: Have NGOs Distorted
or Illuminated the Benefits and Hazards of Genetically Modified Organisms?, 13 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTh.L. & POL'Y 137, 147 (2002).
29 Buechle, supra note 27.
30 For example, a new type of cotton was tested in India that yielded 40% more per acre
and required 7% less pesticide spraying. The use of this product would greatly enhance the
export potential of India, let alone the income gains to farmers in that country. Francer, su-
pra note 11, at 264 n.40.
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ing area of technology. An example of how this hesitance to conduct re-
search could be costly to Third World citizens is the current possibility that
a banana and plantain blight could extinguish the Cavendish banana, a sta-
ple to half a billion people in Africa and Asia. 31 Research into a GM ver-
sion of the banana that would be resistant to the blight has been hampered
by concerns that GM bananas could "put off consumers with GM concerns"
in the European Union.32 The current situation is considered by some to be
comparable to the Great Potato Blight which devastated Ireland in the 19th
Century.33
There are possible drawbacks to the use of biotechnology in crop pro-
duction, including claims of cross-pollination of neighboring crops, damage
to non-pest native fauna, and a reduction of the usefulness of these crops as
pests grow resistant to the bacteria found in these GM crops.34 No scientific
evidence has been produced, not even hypothetically, that these crops are
harmful to consumers in the short or the long term. 5 However, a deeper
sense of mistrust of the corporate interests involved,36 and nostalgia for a
simpler time when food was grown at the local farm underlie the worries
voiced by the "grassroots" detractors of this new technology.
37
IV. AN EXPLANATION OF THE CURRENT EUROPEAN UNION REGULATORY
REGIME CONCERNING GMOs
In response to adverse public opinion and pressure from interest groups
within Europe, the European Council and Parliament has delivered a num-
ber of Directives and Regulations in recent years that greatly curtail the
growth, distribution, or marketing of GMO-containing foodstuffs within the
European Union. The two most important regulations are Council Directive
90/220 (Replaced by 2001/18/EC) and Council Regulations 258/97 and
1139/98. Council Directive 2001/18/EC is designed to prohibit the "delib-
erate release" of GMOs into the E.U. environment or the "placing [of
GMOs] on the market" without prior approval from the Member States.38
The prior approval process is lengthy and based on the subjective conclu-
sion of each Member State of the safety of the GMO.
31 Bananas could split for good, BBC NEWS, WORLD EDITION, Sci. & TECH., Jan. 16,
2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/2664373.stm.
32 id.
33 id.
34 See discussion infra Section VI.35 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS,
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS at 9, May 23, 2002, available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d02566.pdf (last searched Sept. 6, 2003) [hereinafter G.A.O. Report].
36 Williams, supra note 16.
3 7 d. at 769.38 Council Directive 2001/18/EC, supra note 1, at pmbl. 25.
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The requirements for "deliberate release" into the environment39 or
"placing on the market" 40 are distinct but similar. The person attempting to
introduce the GMO must file a notification with the competent agency in
the country targeted for introduction. 41 The notification must contain the
information listed in Annex III and IV of the Directive.42 The list of infor-
mation needed is exhaustive; it obviously must be in order to cover all pos-
sible risks of releasing GMOs into the environment. It includes items such
as "[p]otential interactions with the abiotic environment ''43  and
"[i]nformation on how the genetically-modified plant differs from the re-
cipient plant ' 4 as well as a "[d]escription of the release site ecosystem, in-
cluding climate, flora and fauna. 'A5 Some of these items have the flavor of
an interrogatory: taking one line to ask, but possibly taking two hundred
pages to adequately answer. Thereafter, the competent agency has 90 days
to review the application.46 Importantly, the Member State's competent au-
thori can extend this period indefinitely by asking for further informa-
tion.47 Then, if the competent authority finds that the GMO is safe for
placement on the market, it must prepare an assessment of the application
and send it to the (European) Commission, who then sends it to all the other
48Member States. At this point, the Commission and the Member States
have 105 days to discuss the application and arrive at an agreement as to
whether the GMO should be placed on the market. 49 However, if the Mem-
ber States take any additional time to ask questions of the applicant, that
time is not counted toward the 105 days.50 If a Member State does object to
the application, then an additional 120 days will be added so that a decision
" Id. at art. 2, T 3. "Deliberate Release" into the environment is defined as "any inten-
tional introduction into the environment of a GMO or a combination of GMOs for which no
specific containment measures are used to limit their contact with and to provide a high level
of safety for the general population and the environment." Presumably, this means the plant-
ing of GMO crops for research or commercial purposes.
40 Id. at art. 2, 4. "Placing on the market" means making available to third parties,
whether in return for payment or free of charge. This would include the sale of bulk grains
or packaged food items which contain GMOs.
41 Id. at art. 6, 1 (for release into the environment of a GMO); art. 13 1 (for placing in
the market of a GMO).42 Id. at art. 13, 9 2(a).
43 Id. at annex III B (D)I 1.
44 Id. at annex III B (D)4.
45 Id. at annex III B (E)2.
46 Id at art. 6, 9 5 (for release into the environment of a GMO); art. 14 2 (for placing in
the market of a GMO).
47 Id. at art. 6, 6(a) (for release into the environment of a GMO); art. 14 4 (for placing
in the market of a GMO).
41Id. at art. 14,92.
41Id. at art. 15,9 1.
50 Id.
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can be reached. 51 Any time spent awaiting further information requested of
the applicant will not accrue to those 120 days.52
Possibly the most troublesome part of Directive 2001/18 is that it al-
lows for a Member State to "take into consideration ethical aspects when
GMOs are deliberately released or placed on the market as or in prod-
ucts. '53 Although this sounds like rhetorical gibberish, it is likely taken
very seriously. None other than the Prince of Wales has said: "The use of
these techniques raises, it seems to me, crucial ethical and practical consid-
erations. I happen to believe that this kind of genetic modification takes
mankind into realms that belong to God, and to God alone.,
54
There is no telling how European politicians could restrain the import
of GMOs based on "ethical considerations." No matter what the facial re-
quirements for introducing new GMOs into the European market, the reality
is that the European Union has refused to allow any new GMOs into the re-
gion since 1998, and fourteen applications are still awaiting approval. 55
E.U. ministers have indicated that they will block any new registrations of
GMOs. 56 This appears to be a moratorium without an end in sight.57
Council Regulation 258/97 mandates the labeling of food and food in-
gredients that may contain GMOs. 58 In a later regulation, the European Un-
ion added GM soya and maize to the list of items that have to be labeled as
containing GMOs. 59 These two products had previously been spared label-
ing since the European Union had approved of their distribution within.
These Regulations present a dilemma to U.S. exporters, since the U.S. agri-
511d. at art. 18, 1.
52 id.
53 ld. at pmbl., 9.
54 The Prince of Wales, Seeds of Disaster, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 8, 1998, avail-
able at http://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/speeches/agriculture 08061998.html.
55 Nanda, supra note 20, at 262. This number of shelved applications is as of 2000.
Since this moratorium has not been lifted, it is to be expected that there are more than 14 ap-
plications to introduce GMOs that have not been approved by the European Union.
56 Francer, supra note 11, at 289.57 Id. See also G.A.O. Report, supra note 35, which notes that the European Union has
not approved any new GM foods in several years.
Compare Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1996) with
Council Regulation 258/97, supra note 2. The difference between U.S. and European views
on labeling could not be starker. A Second Circuit ruling decided that a Vermont statute
mandating labeling of dairy products from cows treated with bovine growth hormone was
unconstitutional because it violated the dairy manufacturers First Amendment right not to
speak. In doing so, the court noted that since there was no proof that the growth hormone
was potentially harmful, "strong consumer interest and the public's 'right to know' were
"insufficient to justify compromising protected constitutional rights." See also Oregon ballot
initiative election results, available at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2002/pages/
ballot/index.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2003). A 2002 ballot initiative in Oregon, one of the
most progressive in the United States, would have required mandatory labeling of all GMO
products entering the state. It failed in a statewide vote by a margin of 71% to 29% after a
vigorous statewide debate of the pros and cons of labeling.
59 Council Regulation 1139/98, supra note 2.
The European Union's Efforts to Sidestep the WTO through its Ban on GMOs
24:173 (2003)
cultural system does not allow for the separation of bulk6Aoods into catego-
ries of "GMO" and "GMO-free" shipments of grain. Therefore, the
United States would have to label any shipments to the European Union,
since the shipment "may" contain GMOs. This requirement has led to
large losses in U.S. exports, as many E.U. grain buyers are unwilling to
purchase GMO-containing products.
62
To clarify what quantity of GMOs would constitute the need for label-
ing, the European Union decided on a level of one percent as the de mini-
mus threshold for products that would require labeling.63 This seems to be
an arbitrary limit, without a policy or safety justification cited by the Regu-
lation.64 It may be difficult for the European Union to justify the rationale
for this particular limit before the WTO or any other adjudicating body.65
V. THE E.U. LEGISLATION IS NOT COMPLIANT WITH THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION' S MANDATES
In her article, Ms. Lively contends that these restrictions are not in vio-
lation of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS") or the Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT") that were signed by the
European Union during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Her thesis is that "considering the real and potentially
dangerous health and environmental risks posed by GMOs," the EC's re-
strictions do not amount to illegal Non-Trade Barriers ("NTBs") "under
current international trade law."
6
Ms. Lively rests heavily on the view that since there is substantial evi-
dence that GMOs pose a threat to health and the environment, regulation is
necessary and appropriate. These supposed threats, however, have not nec-
essarily been proven, as will be demonstrated in Section VII. Her article
60 Nanda, supra note 20, at 276.
61 Francer, supra note 11, at 287-88.
62 Presumably, this was the effect the interest groups were hoping for: a regulatory man-
date that effectively blocks competition from cheaper price exporters. The original Council
Regulation 258/97 and Council Directive 90/220 did not provide effective means for keeping
out competition of bulk grains, so the regime was tightened by Council Regulation 1139/98.
Since the European Union agrees that there is no foreseeable harm that is posed by the soya
and maize (the European Union has cleared these products for entry and consumption in
Europe) the only reason for the labeling requirements is concern regarding competition, not
public safety concern.
63 Commission Regulation 49/2000, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (L 6) 13; See CORN CAPSULES, EU
Biotech Moratorium Still in Place Despite New Directive, Nov. 4, 2002, at http://
www.com.org/web/cc 1102.htm. It is important to note that the European Parliament has
been in favor of an even stricter threshold, 0.5%, for labeling.
64 Commission Regulation 49/2000, supra note 63, at art. 8. This Regulation notes that
1% "remains low," yet takes feasibility into account. There is no discussion of why 1% may
be spnificant in affecting health or safety.
Francer, supra note 11, at 289.
66 Lively, supra note 3, at 241.
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also states that this legislation by the EC is not discriminatory against U.S.
exporters. However, she fails to address the fact that the inordinate nega-
tive effect this legislation has had on U.S. exporters may be construed by
the WTO as a de facto trade barrier. Ms. Lively also uses the Rio Declara-
tion on Environment and Development ("Rio Declaration"), which both the
United States and the European Union signed, to purport that the "Precau-
tionary Principle" used by the European Union can justify this legislation.67
However, the Precautionary Principle has been rejected by the WTO appel-
late body that invalidated the recent E.U. ban on North American beef.68
For these reasons and others that will be examined below, the current E.U.
regulatory regime on GMOs is out of step with the WTO and its ancillary
agreements.
One of the reasons this legislation was necessary at the E.U. level was
that some E.U. Member States had already begun individually regulating,
and in some cases proscribing, GMOs in a conflicting manner, necessitating
a unified, Union-wide policy.69 One of the reasons that the European Union
wrote these regulations was to bring a united European answer to this per-
ceived threat from GMOs that would satisfy the international agreements
that the European Union had signed.70 Nonetheless, in an understandable
effort to appease their more stridently GMO-opposing Member States, the
E.U. legislation continues to be outside the limit of acceptable restrictions
on trade under the WTO agreements.
A. The E.U. Legislation is in Conflict with the SPS and TBT Agreements
of the WTO.
The European Union's Directive 2001/18 on the deliberate release into
the environment of GMOs ("Directive on the Release of GMOs") states that
an environmental risk assessment should be performed prior to the release
of the GMOs into the environment. 71 This Directive is an amendment to,
and repeals, Directive 90/220/EEC on the deliberate release into the envi-
ronment of GMOs, which is discussed in Ms. Lively's article. 72 The Direc-
67 See discussion of precautionary principle infra Section V(B).
68 World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body: EC Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Jan. 16, 1998, WT/DS48/AB/R, WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Decisions, 4 Bernan's Ann. Rptr. 275 (1998) [hereinafter WTO Hormone Decision],
available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/ec-hormones(ab).pdf (last visited
Nov. 10, 2003).
69 Council Directive 2001/18, supra note 1, at pmbl., 18. I believe Denmark and Aus-
tria had completely banned GMO or GMO-containing imports, which is obviously contrary
to the agreements ancillary to the WTO.
70 Id. at pmbl., 13. Interestingly, the preamble notes that this Directive should comply
with "trade agreements," not mentioning the WTO, but mentioning the Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety. It is clear that this Directive was aimed more at satisfying the requirements of
the latter.71 d. at pmbl., 19.
72 See Lively, supra note 3.
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tive on the Release of GMOs is in clear contradiction to the Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) signed by
the European Union. The SPS Agreement states, at art. 5, 1 that "Mem-
bers shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on
an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human,
animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment tech-
niques developed by the relevant international organizations. 73
The European Union has essentially reversed the process. The Direc-
tive on the Release of GMOs has called for a sanitary measure that is essen-
tially a moratorium on the release of GMOs, until a risk assessment has
been carried Out. 74 However, the SPS agreement states that any measure
should be based on a risk assessment. The European Union is thus pre-
cluded from enacting a moratorium, until an assessment shows that there is
a risk to human, animal or plant life or health.
There is a potential caveat to the analysis found at art. 5, 7 of the
SPS, which states that "in cases where relevant scientific evidence is insuf-
ficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary meas-
ures on the basis of available pertinent information., 75 This question then
becomes a virtual Rorschach ink blot test. On the one hand, one could be-
lieve that there is no scientific evidence unequivocally proving the safety of
GMO use, and therefore, this uncertainty allows the current E.U. regulation.
On the other hand, one could believe that since decades of research have not
shown sufficient proof that these crops pose a risk, a risk assessment should
be done before placing protective measures against their use.
Detractors of biotechnology and GMOs frequently cite the "novelty" of
the science.76 However, merely stating that a technology is new does not
make it so. European consumer angst over the use of GMOs may be new,
but the use of these products is not. Anti-pest GMOs such as the Bt crops
have been in place for over fifteen years 77 and are planted on an area twice
the size of Great Britain.78 Modern biotechnology has been used for over
twenty-five years, with "geriodic scrutiny and risk evaluation" without evi-
dence of harm as a result. 9 The ability to extract genes and transplant them
into different organisms came about in the 1970s.80 This technology was
not invented yesterday, and there is no grounds for a claim that the "rele-
73 SPS Agreement, 1867 U.N.T.S. 495, at art. 5, 1 (emphasis added).
74 Council Directive 2001/18, supra note 1, at pmbl., 19.
75 SPS Agreement, supra note 4, at art. 5, 7.
76 Lively, supra note 3, at 243.
77 Buechle, supra note 27, at 289.78 Id. at 283.
79 Id; See also, Julian Kinderlerer, Genetically Modified Organisms: A European Scien-
tist's View, 8 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 556, 561 (2000).80 G.A.O. Report, supra note 35, at 4.
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vant scientific information is insufficient" so as to preclude the need for a
risk assessment before regulation under SPS Art. 5 7.81
It is interesting to note that Art 5, 7 does state that members should
base their measures on available pertinent information, including that of
relevant international organizations. 82 The United Nations, after a review of
the information regarding GMOs, has recommended the expanded use of
GMOs to improve yield and nutrition. 83 Such a finding would not be help-
ful to the European Union in a potential case before the WTO.
Another clause by which the Directive on the Release of GMOs could
be struck down by the WTO is art. 4, 1 of the SPS.8 4 This is the equiva-
lence clause of the SPS, and it states that Members shall accept the sanitary
or phytosanitary measures of other states if the exporting Member can "ob-
jectively demonstrate[] to the importing Member that its measures achieve
the importing Member's" level of protection.8 5 This is applicable even if
the measures of the exporting Member are different from the measures in
the importing country. 8 If this portion of the SPS is to be construed liter-
ally, the United States should be able to prove to the WTO that the meas-
ures the U.S. system takes ensure that GMO products which are marketed
and consumed are safe for the environment and/or human consumption. It
should not be very difficult to show that the European Union and the United
States have equivalent levels of protection for their citizens and environ-
ment, since the United States Government has no less than three regulatory
bodies-the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture ("USDA") and the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA")-that monitor and assure the safety of GM foods. 8 7 The
coordinator of the FDA's food and biotechnology policy, James Maryanski,
stated during a recent U.N. panel that there are 50 varieties of GM crops in
the U.S. market that are "as safe as other foods on the market." 88 Each of
the 50 GM crops that have been approved by the FDA have undergone rig-
orous testing to pass the scrutiny of the FDA under a policy that started
monitoring these crops in 1992.9
These controls include the review of necessary data to assess the safety
of the crop, the evaluation of the data by teams of diversely qualified FDA
agents who can request additional data from the company looking to market
the crop, and the tailoring of specific investigations to fit the "novelty" of
81 SPS Agreement, supra note 4, at art. 5, 7.
82 Id.
83 Aita, supra note 10.
84 SPS Agreement, supra note 4, at art. 4, 1.
85 id.
86 id.
87 Francer, supra note 11, at 265-75. Discussion of the regulatory framework concerning
GMOs in the U.S., with an emphasis on the FDA's procedures and guidelines.
88 Aita, supra note 10.
89 G.A.O. Report, supra note 35, at 3.
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the application, thereby assuring that the FDA has adequate time to study
the application.9" The consultation process between the FDA and the com-
panies has historically been voluntary, but the FDA in 2001 proposed rules
which would make this process mandatory, with the companies giving no-
tice to the FDA 120 days before their intended marketing of the product.9
The proposed rules will not significantly alter current practice, however, as
companies now come to the FDA in the early stages of development to
streamline the process in a "consultation" that lasts anywhere from 18
months to 3 years. 92 Under the 1992 policy, this includes several risk as-
sessment "decision trees" that provide a "step by step" testing structure.9 3
This sounds very similar to the Directive on the Release of GMOs, which
states that "the introduction of GMOs into the environment should be car-
ried out according to the 'step by step' principle." 94 The scale of release is
increased gradually, but only when prior tests indicate that the next step can
be taken.9 During a recent General Accounting Office survey of the effec-
tiveness of the FDA safety process, the European Union, along with other
bodies and organizations, stated that the tests were "good" or "very good"
and were adequate to ensure safety of GM products for public consump-
tion.96
The USDA and EPA have a stronger role in ensuring the environ-
mental viability of GMOs. For any grower to field test a pest or herbicide-
resistant GMO on more than 10 acres, the grower must be reviewed by the
EPA and receive a grant.97 Prior to the commercialization of the crop, the
EPA reviews the application, receives comments from thepublic, and pos-
sibly requests the counsel of independent scientific experts.
All of this evidence leads to the conclusion that the United States can
"objectively demonstrate" that its measures provide the same level of pro-
tection as the E.U. measures. The European Union, therefore, has no alter-
native under Art 4 1 of the SPS but to allow GMOs that had passed U.S.
inspection to enter the European Union, particularly after stating in the
G.A.O. Report that the FDA measures ensure public safety, and that the
FDA regimen of tests provides the "wei ht of evidence needed for scientists
to make an accurate assessment of risk.' 9
90 Id.
91 Raymond Formanek, Proposed Rules Issued for Bioengineered Foods, FDA
CONSUMER, No. 2, Vol. 3 5, at 9, Mar. 1, 2001, available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/
2001/201food.html.92 G.A.O. Report, supra note 35, at 19.
93 Id.
94 Council Directive 2001/18, supra note 1, at pmbl. 24.
95 Id.96 G.A.O. Report, supra note 35, at 16.
9 7 Id. at 7.
98 Id.
99 1d. at 16.
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B. The European Union cannot rely on the use of the "Precautionary
Principle" to prevent GMOs from entering the European Union
The European Union has explicitly based its regulation of the release
of GMOs into the environment and placing of GMOs on the market on the
"Precautionary Principle."' 00 In fact, one of the reasons the Directive on the
Release of GMOs was enacted, replacing Directive 90/220, was to make
more explicit reference to the Precautionary Principle as a justification for
the regulation.' 0 1
Title XIX ("the Environment title") of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community ("EC Treaty") upholds as two of its objectives "pro-
tecting and improving the quality of the environment" and "protecting hu-
man health."' 0  To this end, EC policy concerning "the environment shall
aim at a high level of protection" and "shall be based on the precautionary
principle."'03 Although only the Environment title of the E.U. treaty states
a use of the precautionary principle as policy, subsequent European Com-
mission Communications have expanded the European Union's understand-
ing of the precautionary principle to include human health as well.' 
04
The precautionary principle is a relatively new term in the lexicon of
environmental regulation. The German Green Party introduced the term, 105
and it only "acquired currency" in the 1990s.
10 6
The definition of the precautionary principle is not given in the E.U.
Treaty, or in the Directives that regulate the production and distribution
within the European Union of GMOs. That lack of definition is intended,
presumably, to allow the European Union the leeway to carry out whatever
measures it feels are necessary to "maintain a high level of protection."',
0 7
The Rio Declaration on Development and the Environment explained a
precautionary principle cited in the document as "lack of full scientific cer-
tainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost effective measures
100 Council Directive 2001/18, supra note 1, at pmbl., 6, 8.
101 Ruth MacKenzie & Sylvia Francescon, The Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods
in the European Union: an Overview, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 530, 541 (2000).
102 CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,
Dec. 24, 2002, tit. XIX, art 174, O.J. (C 325) 107 (2002) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
1"3 Id. at 117.
104 MacKenzie, Francescon, supra note 101, at 533. See also Council Directive 2001/18,
supra, note 1, at pt. A, art. 1.
105 JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 284 (Cam-
bridge U. Press 2000).
106 Id. at 525.
107 EC TREATY, supra note 102, at 117. See also Council Directive 2001/18, supra note
1. The lack of a definition of this term is especially frustrating in the Directives, since there
is a section on definitions that is intended to guide the different states in the implementation
of the E.U. legislation. It is the author's contention that this ambiguity is designed to allow
any measures taken by the Member States to be qualified a "precautionary principles" taken
to protect their markets.
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to prevent environmental degradation."' 10 8 However, there is no consensus
as to the meaning of precautionary principle, leading to uncertainty about
its application.'0 9 This uncertainty lessens the practical utility of the pre-
cautionary principle as a means of regulating these new agricultural bio-
technologies and will continue to do so until its meaning is interpreted with
authority." 0 Because of its abstract nature, the "precautionary principle
tends to lose in rhetorical battles with the principle of deregulation."' 1
C. Previous WTO Rulings Undermine the Ability of the European Union to
apply the Precautionary Principle
Although the precautionary principle is embedded in the E.U. Treaty, it
is questionable whether it applies to human health or environmental stan-
dards that have international applications. In an important 1998 decision, a
WTO Appellate Body heard arguments from the United States, Canada, and
the European Union concerning the use of natural and synthetic growth
hormones in North American cattle 12 ("WTO Hormone Decision"). Al-
though strictly speaking, WTO Appellate Body rulings apply only to the
facts and parties at hand, the Appellate Body "has recognized that prior de-
cisions are important, since the precedents create legitimate expectations
among WTO members."' 13 Therefore, the WTO Hormone Decision is in-
structive as to how the WTO may rule in a similar case.
The WTO Hormone Decision arose out of a complaint from the United
States and Canada concerning a series of E.U. Directives prohibiting the
import of bovine meat and meat products where the cattle had been given
either natural or synthetic hormones for growth purposes.' 1 4 The United
States and Canada claimed that these Directives were in violation of the
SPS Agreement ancillary to the WTO." 5 The WTO Appellate Body con-
cluded that the EC had violated the SPS Agreement and requested that the
EC bring their SPS measures (the Meat Products regulations) into confor-
mity with their obligations under the WTO Agreements."
16
108 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, U.N. Conference
on Environment and Development, Annex 1, princ. 15, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), 31 I.L.M.
874, 879 (1992), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl51/ (last visited Nov.
28, 2003).
109 Dorothy Nelkin, Philippe Sands & Richard B. Stewart, The International Challenge of
Genetically Modified Organism Regulation, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 523, 526 (2000).
ll 01d.
"11 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOs, supra note 105, at 284.
112 WTO Hormone Decision, supra note 68.
113 John S. Fredland, Unlabel Their Frankenstein Foods!: Evaluating a U.S. Challenge to
the European Commission 's Labeling Requirements for Food Products Containing Geneti-
callyv-Modified Organisms, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 183, 196 (2000).
4 WTO Hormone Decision, supra note 68, at 285.
"
5 Id. at 296.
116 id. at 352.
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In their arguments before the Appellate Body, the European Union ar-
gued that it could override Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS by using the pre-
cautionary principle.117 Articles 5.1 and 5.2 state that any sanitary or
phytosanitary measures must be based on an appropriate assessment of the
"risks to human animal or plant life or health" 18 and this risk assessment
should take into account available scientific evidence, etc.
119
In the Beef Hormone decision, the WTO body claimed that "the pre-
cautionary principle ... still awaits authoritative formulation."120 The Ap-
pellate Body concludes that even if the precautionary principle were to be
considered a "general customary rule of international law," it does not, by
itself, relieve the Appellate Body from reading the provisions of the SPS
agreement, and therefore the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel (first in-
stance body) "that the precautionary principle does not override the provi-
sions of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement."'
' 21
Furthermore, the European Court of Justice has decided a string of
cases that could invalidate the current E.U. moratorium, based on its own
application of the precautionary principle. These include Kellogg v. Nor-
wegian Food Control Agency and Monsanto v. Council of the European
Union.122 In these cases, the European Court of Justice rejected appeals to
the precautionary principle by various governments looking to keep imports
out of their territory. The court did not decide in favor of the E.U. Member
States (e.g. Denmark) due to the fact that there was no risk assessment per-
formed on the part of the E.U. Member States.
12 3
It is plausible that the European Court of Justice would strike down
these anti-GMO Regulations based on the European Union's own under-
standing of the Precautionary Principle. A Communication from the Euro-
pean Commission on the on the Precautionary Principle stated these five
guidelines:
1. Measures ... must not be disproportionate to the desired level of pro-
tection and must not aim at zero risk.
2. Comparable situations should not be treated differently, and ... differ-
ent situations should not be treated in the same way, unless there are
objective grounds for doing so.
3. Measures ... should be comparable in nature and scope with measures
already taken in equivalent areas in which all the scientific data are
available.
18 SPS Agreement, supra note 4, at 496.
9Id.120 WTO Hormone Decision, cited by Linda O'Neil Coleman, The European Union: An
Appropriate Modelfor a Precautionary Approach?, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 609, 631 (2000).
21 WTO Hormone Decision, supra note 68, at 315.
122 Coleman, supra note 120, at 622-23.
123 id.
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4. This examination should include an economic cost/benefit analysis
when this is appropriate and feasible. However, other analysis methods
... may also be relevant.
5. The measures must be of a provisional nature pending the availability
of more reliable scientific data... Scientific research shall be continued
with a view to obtaining more complete data.'
24
The European Union, in carrying out this five-year moratorium, has
not followed these guidelines. The moratorium itself, by definition, is
based on a "zero risk" strategy. 25 The length of the moratorium proves that
it is not of a "provisional nature,"'' 26 nor does it seem that the European Un-
ion has been actively continuing "scientific research"'' 27 to gain more com-
plete data during the last five years. If these concerns were brought before
the European Court of Justice, that judicial body could rule against the
European Union in this regard.
Therefore, the European Union cannot state that they have enacted
these matters as a protective measure under the precautionary principle;
there needs to be a risk assessment performed to establish that there is a risk
to human, animal or plant life of health, even under the European Union's
own definition of the term.
D. The European Union has not Performed a Risk Assessment Regarding
the Safety of GMOs
There is one striking difference between the Beef Hormone situation
and the current situation: the European Union has not conducted any stud-
ies to determine the potential risks to human health or the environment from
the release into the environment or placing on the market of GMOs. In the
Beef Hormone situation, the European Union had conducted or participated
in several studies, including the 1982 Report of the EC Scientific Veterinary
Committee, Scientific Committee for Animal Nutrition and the Scientific
Committee for Food on the basis of the Report of the Scientific Group on
Anabolic Agents in Animal Production ("Lamming Report'). 128 That is not
the case in the GMO scenario. What the European Union can point to is a
"hysterical ... media reaction"'' 29 and "adverse public opinion' 30 based
124 Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, European Un-




128 WTO Hormone Decision, supra note 68, at 336. This is only one of six scientific
studies that were reportedly included by the European Union in the decision to ban North
American beef products. However, as the Appellate Body pointed out, each one of these
studies proved the meat products to be safe, and therefore did not rationally support the EC
import prohibition.
129 Kinderlerer, supra note 79, at 557.
13 Id. at 563.
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mainly from fears generated by other food crises such as BSE (mad cow
disease), salmonella, E. coli, and other failings of the European regulatory
system. It seems that the European government leaders have abdicated
their duty to educate their citizens (or failed to educate themselves) about
the benefits and risks of GMOs, rather than regulating in reaction to "un-
warranted public hysteria."'' 32 Unfortunately for the European Union, the
factors of public and media hysteria cannot be considered as an argument
before the WTO. 133 So, what has the European Union done to show that it
has scientific proof of a threat from GMOs?
Ms. Lively's article cites the opinion from the 1998 "Beef Hormone"
decision of the WTO Appellate Body that stated that if there is not a
"known harmful effect on human health or the environment, then the regu-
lations in question cannot be considered 'effective' for achieving their pro-
tective goal and therefore, are not necessary.' 34 In other words, without a
risk assessment demonstrating a harmful effect on health or the environ-
ment, the regulation will not stand, since it cannot rest solely on the "pre-
cautionary principle" embedded in the E.U. Treaties. 35 Ms. Lively agrees
that "[n]o existing scientific evidence shows that GMOs positively pose se-
rious threats to human or environmental health."' 136 Therefore, even under
her own analysis, the WTO would have to strike down the E.U. legislation,
because restrictive trade practices cannot be based on simple intuition that a
product is dangerous; there must be a risk assessment that points to that
conclusion. Otherwise, the legislation is purely arbitrary and therefore dis-
criminatory.
E. The Cartagena Protocol On Biosafety
Furthermore, Ms. Lively does not take note of the Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety, another treaty signed by both the United States and the Euro-
pean Union. 3 7  This document enumerates safety measures that can be
taken by Member States to protect their environments from "the conse-
quences of genetic engineering."' 3 8 One of its provisions is that a state can
prohibit the import of GMOs even if there "is a lack of scientific certainty"
that the product is dangerous. 139 However, this ability to prohibit GMOs
131 Id. at 556.
132 Francer, supra note 11, at 313.
133 Kinderlerer, supra note 79, at 563.
134 Lively, supra note 3, at 254.
35 See WTO Hormone Decision, supra note 68.
136 Lively, supra note 3, at 253.
13 7 Id.
138 Coleman, supra note 120, at 631 n.62.
139 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29,
2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 (2000) (entered into force Sept. 11, 2003), available at http://
www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2003) [hereinafter
Cartagena Protocol].
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only applies to living organisms, since no advance notice or permission is
required "for exports of agricultural commodities meant for eating or proc-
essing.' 140 The Cartagena Protocol's scope is limited to "living modified
organisms"' 141 which are defined as a "biological entity capable of transfer-
ring or replicating genetic material.' 42 Once the "LMO" has been proc-
essed, it no longer is able to transfer genetic material, and is therefore not
subject to pre-approval upon importation. 43 Therefore, under the Cartagena
Protocol, the United States would have the ability to strike out the portions
of the E.U. legislation that attach testing periods for products that are de-
signed for eating or processing. 44
F. Conclusion
Therefore, the United States could invalidate this policy not only under
the Appellate Body of the WTO, but also under the Cartagena Protocol, or
even the European Union's own court system. The U.S. Trade Representa-
tive was correct when he said that the current E.U. moratorium is contrary
to European and international law. 1
45
VI. AN EXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTS A CLAIM OF THE
DANGERS OF GMOs.
Ms. Lively refers to three instances that support the belief that GMOs
are potentially harmful to health and the environment. They are the Brazil
nut case, 146 the Monarch butterfly case, 147 and the Arpad Pusztai experiment
that "proved" that rats which were fed GM potatoes experienced health
problems. 48 However, while each of these examples has been used time
and again by the detractors of GMO technology, each bears little weight.
A. The Brazil Nut
In the Brazil nut case, researchers had inserted a gene from the Brazil
nut into a strain of soybeans, with the hope of enhancing the protein content
of the soybean. 49 They succeeded in this attempt, making the soybean in
question more nutritionally rich, without any detriment to the yield or qual-
ity of the crop. 50 However, the trait of the Brazil nut gene that causes an
140 Cartagena Protocol, cited by Coleman, supra note 120, at 632.
14 1 Buechle, supra note 27, at 285.
142 Cartagena Protocol, supra note 139, at art. 3(h).
143 Buechle, supra note 27, at 286.
144 See generally Cartagena Protocol, supra note 139.
145 CORN CAPSULES, supra note 63.
146 Lively, supra note 3, at 244.
147 Id.
141ld. at 16.
149 Julie A. Nordlee et al., Identification of a Brazil-Nut Allergen in Transgenic Soybeans,
344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 688, 688 (1996).
150 Id.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 24:173 (2003)
allergic reaction in some people was also transferred to the soybean, so that
people who ate the soybean would have the same reaction that they had to
the nut.151 There are two reasons why this situation does not prove the dan-
gers of GMOs. First, the researchers tested the soybean for any allergic re-
actions before the soybean was produced commercially; there were safety
checks in place to assure the product's safety before market placement.
1
Second, there are thousands of products that contain possible allergens, and
the FDA allows them to go to market once they have a label to describe the
allergen that the product contains.153 Had the company gone ahead with
production and distribution, it is possible that all that would be needed to
guarantee the safety of products made from the soybean would be a label.
15 4
This case is the only known case of an allergen being transmitted to a
GMO, and it was discovered before it ever reached the market. 55
B. The Monarch Butterfly
The second example of a harm committed by the use of GMOs is the
toxicity of Bt corn (maize) to the Monarch butterfly. This corn contains a
pesticide that is lethal to the European corn borer, an insect that destroys
"thousands of acres of crops each year."1 56 What is interesting in this de-
bate is that "organic" growers have been spraying the Bt protein on their
crops since the 1960s, but they are dead set against the "Frankenstein Food"
containing the Bt protein.157  A study conducted by Cornell University
caused shockwaves when it reported that the Bt contained in GMO corn
pollen was toxic to Monarch butterfly larvae.1 58 However, this research was
done in a lab, not in the field. 159 Later testing, conducted on behalf of the
EPA, disputed the findings of the Cornell study. 60 This study, published in
the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (PNAS) in September,
l51 See generally id
152 Id. The opening paragraph of the Nordlee article states that the reason for this study is
a FDA-mandated test for developers of new plant varieties. See also Buechle, supra note 27,
at 293. The bean was never produced commercially, as researchers discovered the problem
before any beans were sold.
153 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FED. REGISTER, VOL. 57,
NO. 104, STATEMENT OF POLICY: FOODS DERIVED FROM NEW PLANT VARIETIES 22984-23005
(1992). Cited in Nordlee et al., supra note 149.
154 Nordlee et al., supra note 149, at 691. In fact, this is the prescribed remedy: if the
product goes to market, there should be a label alerting consumers of the possible allergenic
properties of the food.
55 G.A.O. Report, supra note 35, at 16.
156 Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47, 59
(2001), cited in Lively, supra note 3, at 245.
157 Kolehmainen, supra note 9, at 273.
158 CNN.com, Researchers Find Bio-engineered Corn Harms Butterflies, May 20, 1999,
at http://www.cnn.com/NATURE/9905/20/butterfly.killers/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).
159 Id.
160 GEO-PIE, Impact of Bt-corn on Monarch Butterflies, Sept. 2001, available at http://
www.comm.comell.edu/gmo/issues/monarchs.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).
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2001, studied the amounts of Bt-corn pollen residue on milkweed plants
(the Monarch larvae's only food source) close to corn fields. The research-
ers then fed those amounts to the Monarch butterfly larvae. 61  The re-
searchers, who included scientists from activist groups and the EPA, as well
as the Cornell researcher who conducted the laboratory study, found the ef-
fects on the butterfly larvae to be negligible, even if the entire corn market
were saturated with Bt corn. 62 Only one strain of Bt corn was shown to
have a negative effect on the butterflies, and that strain, Event 167, has
since been discontinued.163 The researchers also came to the conclusion
that the use of traditional pesticides would have a greater negative impact
on the butterflies. 64 Therefore, the use of GM corn, at first thought to be
harmful to Monarch butterflies and other "showcase" fauna, may, on second
reflection, be a positive alternative to traditional crops that need to be
sprayed with pesticide.
Finally, it must also be pointed out that Europe does not have a natural
population of Monarch butterflies, and therefore this particular risk to the
environment cannot be cited by E.U. regulators.1
65
C. The Arpad Pusztai Study
The third example of the potential danger of GMOs which received
considerable press is the study performed in Scotland by Arpad Pusztai in
1998, which reported that rats who consumed transgenic potatoes (contain-
ing a gene encoding a lectin, a protein that can deter pest insects) for a pe-
riod of ten days 66 suffered stunted growth and weakened immune
systems. 67 It must be noted that crops containing this particular lectin,
GNA, are still experimental and "haven't made it to the market yet."'
68
However, two days after the press release of these findings, the director of





165 Monarch Butterfly, at http://www.gpnc.org/monarch.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).
Several websites devoted to the preservation of the Monarch butterfly noted that the destruc-
tion of Mexican forests, where the butterflies winter, is problematic to the survival of the
Monarch, but not one mentioned the use of Bt corn as a factor.
166 There is a discrepancy here. An article in the first Science journal, Martin Enserink,
Preliminary Data Touch off Genetic Food Fight, 283 Sci. 1094 (Feb. 19, 1999), claimed that
the study had been performed over a period of 110 days. An article in the second Science
journal, Martin Enserink, The Lancet Scolded over Pusztai Paper, 286 Sci. 656 (1999),
quoted ten days. However, upon review of Pusztai's published article in The Lancet, the du-
ration of testing was confirmed as ten days. Stanley W. B. Ewen & Arpad Pusztai, Effect of
Diets Containing Genetically Modified Potatoes Expressing Galanthus Nivalis Lectin on Rat
Small Intestine, 354 THE LANCET 1353 (Oct. 16, 1999).
167 Williams, supra note 16, at 768.
168 Enserink, The Lancet Scolded over Pusztai Paper, supra note 166, at 656.
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data turned out to be 'a total muddle' since the "conclusions were based on
experiments with non-transgenic potatoes spiked with a lectin."'169 Later, a
committee audited Pusztai's work and concluded that the evidence did not
suggest the potatoes affected the "growth, organ development, or immune
function" of the rats. 170 Obviously, this row has only led to more anxiety in
an "already confused and worried public" in the European Union and espe-
cially the United Kingdom. 171
A year later, on October 16th, 1999, The Lancet, a "prestigious jour-
nal" in the United Kingdom, published Pusztai's paper detailing his ex-
periment with rats and transgenic potatoes. 72 The Royal Society, among
others, criticized The Lancet, contending that the raw data was "deeply
flawed" and that the journal was exploiting the paper for its own public-
ity. 173 The editor in chief of The New England Journal of Medicine was
quoted as saying, "[w]hen was the last time [The Lancet] published a rat
study that was uninterpretable? This really was dropping the bar."'7 4 John
Pickett, one of the experts who was asked to review the article before publi-
cation, recommended that the journal reject the paper. He told the BBC in
an interview that had it been a student's study, "the student would have
failed whatever examination" to which he was contributing.
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In its published version, Pusztai's earlier claims of stunted growth or
suppressed immune systems were not raised. Instead, the paper focuses on
the thickening of the mucosal lining in the intestinal tracks of rats who had
eaten transgenic potatoes. 176 Even these findings do not go uncontested. In
the same issue of The Lancet, a comment on the study by three Dutch re-
searchers details the flaws of Pusztai's paper: the differences in the rats
could be based on nutritional differences between the potatoes, the small
number of specimens (only 6 rats in each group), and the rats, protein
starved from their all-potato diet, were poor candidates to assess the toxicity
of the lectin.
177
169 Enserink, Preliminary Data Touch off Genetic Food Fight, supra note 166, at 1094.
70 Id. at 1095.
171 Id.
172 Ewen & Pusztai, supra note 166, at 1353.
173 Enserink, The Lancet Scolded over Pusztai Paper, supra note 166, at 656.
174 id.
175 id.
176 Ewen & Pusztai, supra note 166, at 1353.
177 Harry A. Kuiper et al., Adequacy of the Methods for Testing the Safety of Genetically
Modified Foods, 354 THE LANCET 1315-16 (Oct. 16, 1999). Incidentally, in another recent
edition of The Lancet, a different article punctured holes in the common wisdom that organic
produce is safer and healthier than conventional mass-produced crops. Apparently, at the
same time the original Pusztai findings were splashed on tabloid presses around the world,
another study showed a link between a popular "natural" insecticide and Parkinson's disease.
However, as the authors of this article note, Greenpeace didn't come out and condemn all
organic farmers using this pesticide or demand that all 680 products on grocery shelves that
use the "natural" insecticide be removed. Shane Morris & Doug Powell, Rats and risk, 357
THE LANCET, Jan. 27, 2001, at 309-10. Call it what you will, I'll call it selective paranoia.
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The study's poor reception from the scientific community questions its
strength as an example of GMO's negative health effects. Not a single mar-
keted GMO has been shown to harm or threaten human health. 78 It is not
possible for the European Union to contend that a risk assessment has been
performed that would call for the restriction on imports of GMOs, since no
reliable studies conclude that consumption of GMOs currently on the mar-
ket poses a health risk.
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D. Fears of Cross-Pollination
Another fear mentioned by Ms. Lively in her article is that these
GMOs can transfer their DNA to non-transgenic plants, creating "super-
weeds" that would be resistant to herbicide or increase the resistance of in-
sects to pesticide. 
80
This does not seem to be a fear amongst the scientists who have made
long-term studies of this problem. In a ten year study conducted by the Im-
perial College in London, transgenic plants were shown to be no more
likely to survive or spread than their traditional counterparts. All four
GMO crop samples died out after having been left unattended for four
years.' 8' Other studies have shown that it is unlikely that weeds will inherit
tolerances from GMOs 182 and also that steps can be taken to prevent this
transfer from occurring. 183
E. Fears of Antibiotic Resistance
Lastly, Ms. Lively cites the fear that the antibiotic-resistant marker
genes, which scientists use to track seeds that have inherited the trans-
planted trait, implanted in GMOs may transfer to humans through consump-
tion.' 84  This would lead to people becoming resistant to antibiotic
treatment, increasing the difficulty in fighting disease. 1
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'78 Editorial, Biotech Panderers, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2001, at B6.
179 G.A.O. Report, supra note 35, at 2. Every one of the 50 GMOs that have been ap-
proved by the U.S. regulatory regime were deemed safe by the independent audit conducted
by the U.S.G.A.O. in consultation with the National Academy of Sciences.is0 Lively, supra note 3, at 245.
181 M. J. Crawley et al., Transgenic Crops in Natural Habitats, 409 NATURE 682 (Feb. 8,
2001). See also, John Whitfield, GM Plants Make Weedy Weeds, Nature.com, (Feb. 8,
2001), available at http://www.nature.com/nsu/010208/010208-9.html. Whitfield's article
clarifies that all the GM crops had died during the first four years, and that this study should
"allay fears that GM plants will be super-weeds, either in their own right or by breeding with
unmodified plants."
182 See Cliff D. Weston, Chilling of the Corn: Agricultural Biotechnology in the Face of
US. Patent Law and the Cartagena Protocol, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 377, 403
(2000).
183 See Norman Borland, We Need Biotech to Feed the World, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 6, 2000,
at A22.
1"84 Lively, supra note 3, at 244-5.
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This fear is without support for several reasons. First, the antibiotics
tracked by the marker genes are highly toxic and rarely, if ever, used clini-
cally to fight disease.' 86 Second, the marker gene appears in trace amounts
too small to be able to degrade antibiotics.18 7 Third, no naturally occurring
mechanism exists that allows the transfer of genes from plant DNA to a mi-
crobe. 
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F. Conclusion of Risks Posed by GMOs
In conclusion, there is no substantiated study or proof that GMOs pose
a threat to human health, animal health, or the environment. Without an as-
sessment showing a risk to "human, animal or plant life or health," the
European Union cannot proscribe sanitary measures against GMO import or
use under the SPS agreement.
189
VII. CONCLUSION: THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS VIOLATED
INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH ITS MORATORIUM ON THE INTRODUCTION OF
GMOS
The European Union has violated the SPS and TBT Agreements to the
Marrakesh Agreement creating the WTO by enacting the Directive on the
Release of GMOs. A WTO Dispute Settlement Panel would find the Euro-
pean Union in violation because it bases its restrictions on the precautionary
principle, rather than the risk assessment requirements of SPS Agreement
Articles 5.1 and 5.2. A WTO Dispute Settlement Panel would further find
that the European Union has not performed a risk assessment to ascertain
whether these restricted GMOs are dangerous to human health or the envi-
ronment. This same body would find that SPS Art. 4.1, the Equivalence
Article, precludes the European Union from regulating these GMOs, since
they are already subject to equivalent regulation in the United States. Fi-
nally, if a Dispute Settlement Panel were to consult scientific experts about
the level of risk inherent in GMOs, the experts would indicate a low level of
risk and thus undermine support of the E.U. regulation.
A. The European Union Incorrectly Used the Precautionary Principle
In the WTO Hormone Decision, the Appellate Body found that the
European Union could not use the precautionary principle as a method of
circumventing the need to perform a risk assessment under the SPS Agree-
ment Articles 5.1 and 5.2 before enforcing restrictions on imports.190 Here,
in the matter of GMOs, the European Union has made the same error, refer-
ring to the precautionary principle in the Directive as a source of authoriza-
1 86 Francer, supra note 11, at 294.
Z8 id.
188 See generally id.
189 SPS Agreement, supra note 4, at 5, 1.
190 WTO Hormone Decision, supra note 68, at 351.
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tion, rather than the SPS Agreement. 191 A Dispute Settlement Panel should
have clear grounds to strike down the EC's use of the precautionary princi-
ple to authorize the regulations.
B. The European Union Failed to Perform a Risk Assessment under SPS
Articles 5.1 and 5.2 before enacting the Moratorium
The European Union has not performed the necessary risk assessments
under the SPS to raise concerns about GMOs. In the WTO Hormone Deci-
sion, the European Union cited six studies on the effects of growth hor-
mones, some of which it had organized, to comply with the requirements of
the SPS. 192 Although the Panel and the Appellate Body found these studies
to show that hormones did not pose an identifiable risk, it was noted that
studies were performed under the auspices of the European Union. 193 In the
present case, the European Union has not performed systematic and inde-
pendent research on the matter. Directive 2001/18/EC requests the Member
states and the Council to conduct such tests and ensure that adequate funds
are provided to conduct such research. 194 However, this is clearly in con-
trast to the requirements of the SPS, where a sanitary measure is to be
"based on an assessment ... of the risks to human, animal orplant life or
health."' 95 The Beef Hormone Decision supports this analysis.'
C. The European Union Cannot Use SPS Art 5.7 as a Means to Circumvent
the Need for a Risk Assessment
The European Union will undoubtedly counter that this situation falls
under the category of SPS Art. 5.7, and, therefore, a risk assessment is not
necessary. However, although the media frenzy in Europe may only be a
few years old, the technology is not. Scientists have been improving and
testing these technologies for over two decades now, without evidence of
harm as a result. 197 Therefore, no ground exists for a claim that the "rele-
vant scientific information is insufficient" to preclude the need for a risk as-
sessment before regulation. 198
D. The United States has an Equivalent Regulatory Framework in Place,
and this Precludes the Need for E.U. Regulation
SPS 4.1 clearly states that a member shall accept the sanitary measures
of other members as equivalent, even if those measures differ from their
191 Council Directive 2001/18, supra note 1, 8.
192 WTO Hormone Decision, supra note 68, at 336.
193 Id.
194 Council Directive 2001/18, supra note 1, 21.
195 SPS Agreement, supra note 4, at 496.
196 WTO Hormone Decision, supra note 68, at 335.
197 Kinderlerer, supra note 79, at 561.
198 SPS Agreement, supra note 4, at 496.
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own, where the exporting member can objectively demonstrate the appro-
priate level of sanitary protection.199 The United States has one of the most
stringent regulatory systems in the world, and since 1986 there have been
safety measures in place from the Food and Drug Administration, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, and the Environmental Protection Agency that
monitor and require testing of any new product introduced to the market or
released into the environment. 2°°
E. Evidence does not Predict Health or Environmental Damage from the
Continued Use of GMOs
When placed under serious scientific scrutiny, GMOs come away as
safe, or safer, than traditional crops that require spraying with insecticide or
other noxious chemicals.20 1 All that remain are over-cited animal studies,
vague concerns about the possibility of resistance to antibiotics, and ill-
founded concerns about pollen transfer creating "superweeds." The fact
remains that food borne illness is generally a product of under-cooking and
poor handling and storage, not "Frankenstein Food., 20
2
For all of these reasons, the World Trade Organization Dispute Settle-
ment Panel will find the European Union to have improperly restricted the
import and distribution of Genetically-Modified Organisms if and when it
hears the case.
'
99 Id. at 495.
200 See generally G.A.O. Report, supra note 35. Overview of the different agencies' roles
in monitoring GMOs.
201 See discussion supra Section VI.
202 Jim Richardson, Food: How Safe, How Altered, NATIONALGEOGRAPHIC.COM, at
http://magma.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0205/sights-n sounds/media2.html (last visited
July 21, 2003). After spending a year touring the world in search of the "problem" of high
tech food production, Richardson came home, bought a thermometer for his refrigerator, and
started washing his hands before eating.
